Most papers dealing with individual overeducation risks focus on labour supply characteristics and workers behaviour. On the other hand, only few studies consider labour demand characteristics and technological change. In this paper we analyse the influence of both demand and supply factors on educational mismatch in a set of ten European countries. Our hypothesis, confirmed by results obtained using ordered probit model with sample selection, is that demand factors generally play major role in reducing educational mismatch in technologically more advanced countries, whereas supply factors are more important in countries that are lagging behind in the international division of labour. At the same time, important cross-country and gender differences have been identified in the way the demand/supply factors operate. All this calls for the fine-tuning of policies aimed to tackle the problem of educational mismatch. Apparently, EPL does not appear neither to hinder technological development, nor increase overeducation.
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Introduction
The utmost utilization of human capital acquired by workers is a goal to be pursued by also removing the obstacles that hinder a proper match between educational qualifications obtained and job requirements.
One can identify three possible statuses for a person: under-/ properly and overeducated.
Most of the papers dealing with educational mismatch concentrate on the issue of overeducation.
The main reason is that it can be thought as a waste of resources, especially in the wake of a rapidly growing supply of graduates. In this paper we do not intend to question the validity of expansionary education policies, rather we aim to provide a broader framework to understanding the observed outcomes. The reality is such that there are many more people who end up being under-or overeducated for the type of job performed. Our enquiry is not only about why this happens, but also which can be the ways to correct for it. In this respect it is very important to understand the channels through which the demand and supply forces operate, and moreover which of the two may prevail in different contexts.
Our hypothesis is that countries which invest more in innovation and technologies should be able to make better use of the educated labour force. The demand factors aim to grasp this effect and are expected to play more important role in reducing the risk of overeducation in more technologically advanced countries. On the opposite, supply factors are expected to be the major cause for both under-and overeducation in countries lagging behind in terms of innovation and technologies.
Testing this hypothesis was implemented in two stages. Firstly, the principal components analysis was employed to cluster countries making part of the EU-LFS data set. We then choose to reduce their number to ten, so that to cover different patterns of labour market regulation, degrees of technological intensity and the incidence of educational mismatch 1 . On a country basis, we further investigate the impact of selected demand and supply factors 2 on the probability of being under-/properly or overeducated. For that purpose we estimate the ordered probit model with sample selection, separately for men and women. 1 In particular, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain are representative of low-to-middle technology and middle-to-high employment protection. The Czech Republic and Hungary have both relatively low technological level and employment protection. France and Germany appear as being in the middle, in terms of both technology and employment protection. The UK is known for low employment protection, coupled with high technological development. Finally, Finland leads the list for technology, despite middle employment protection.
2 On the demand side we consider such characteristics as youth unemployment rate (in order to measure the difficulties at the entry into the labour market for the new graduates) or expenditure per worker in research and development sector (used as a proxy of technological development), all at regional level. On the supply side, participation into lifelong learning and the field of education obtained. For more details see section 3.
hypothesis that the risk of overeducation is highest for workers characterised by low migrating/commuting tolerance.
Only few papers analyzed individual's overeducation risks by focusing on labour demand characteristics and technological change. Most of them highlighted the role of institutional labour markets rigidities and employment protection legislation (EPL) (Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000; Di Pietro, 2002) . In particular, it is argued that the rapid pace of technological change may require school-provided skills higher than those possessed by currently employed workers.
In less flexible labour market settings, firing restrictions may discourage firms to immediately upgrade the level of the "old" workforce in response to rapid changes in technologies (even in the presence of upward changes in skilled workforce availability). At the same time, firms upgrade their "new" hiring standards and recently hired employees, with higher educational qualifications than their older co-workers, are perceived (Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000) or perceive themselves (Di Pietro, 2002) to be overeducated.
Moreover, firing restrictions may discourage firms from adopting new technologies and from undertaking R&D, thus reducing the number of vacancies that can be filled with highly skilled workers in the medium/long run (Di Pietro, 2002) .
Neither of these papers provides strong direct evidence about the relation between EPL, technological change and overeducation.
Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) tested the hypothesis that (young) overeducated workers undergo more firm-specific training than (old) non-overeducated ones, and this allows meeting the needs of employer willing to upgrade the production technology. Unfortunately, their analysis is limited to Portugal and failed to compare countries with different levels of EPL.
On the other hand, Di Pietro (2002) compares 11 countries (with different degrees of labour market flexibility) and shows that strict rules against collective dismissals increase the incidence of overeducation. Nevertheless the analysis does not include any technological variable.
We here identify 3 critical points in this theoretical framework:
1. If newly hired workers have been chosen on the basis of a higher educational level due to jobs technological upgrade, they can perceive themselves as overeducated, but probably they are not "genuine" overeducated (Chevalier and Lindley, 2009) . In this case it would be important to verify whether the higher educational level of newly hired workers has been driven by the necessity that workers could manage technological and organizational changes ("demand effect"), or if it is the result of a simple "supply effect" and labour demand is just drawing newly hired workers from a population where high educated individuals are becoming more numerous.
A large number of economic models in the literature provides a foundation for Skill
Biased Technical Change (SBTC) (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2002; Hornstein et al., 5 2005) . In particular, they contend that more educated, able or experienced workers deal better with technological change. Skilled workers are less adversely affected by the turmoil created by major technological transformations, since it is less costly for them to learn the additional knowledge needed to adopt a new technology (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) . Then, in the early adoption phase of a new technology those who adapt more quickly can reap some benefits. As time goes by, there will be enough workers learning how to work with the new technology to offset the wage differential. In countries characterized by higher aggregate human capital in the (old and young) labour force and by a higher level of lifelong learning (LLL) (especially among the older population) firms would not have to lay off older people to implement technological innovations, and the diffusion of technological changes should be fairly independent from the strictness of EPL.
3. According to Endogenous SBTC (Acemoglu, 1998) , the expansion of educated labour over the post-war period made it profitable to develop machines complementary to skilled workers. If supply creates its own demand, firms may have incentives to undertake R&D and to adopt new technologies in countries characterised by higher aggregate human capital and LLL.
In this case even high levels of EPL would not prevent intensifying R&D and, from this point of view, it should not be thought as a factor that may increase overeducation.
A more promising strand of literature which analyses the impact of labour demand characteristics and technological change on overeducation just focuses on the role of SBTC.
Some of the recent studies claim that SBTC might work in the direction of reducing overeducation (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Gottschalk and Hansen 2003; Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno, 2009) , others instead claim that it would increase overeducation (see e.g. Muysken and
ter Weel, 1999; Malchow-Møller and Skaksen, 2004; Cuadras-Moratò and Mateos-Planas, 2006, 2011 ).
-In particular, Cuadras-Moratò and Mateos-Planas (2011) state that "following a SBTC, firms searching for educated workers become more selective in their hiring policies, rejecting candidates who, in spite of their credentials, turn out to be poorly skilled. Low ability educated workers will then seek employment in jobs that do not require a qualification and become overeducated". In the same line, Muysken and ter Weel (1999) , point out that in the presence of SBTC low educated workers will be crowded out of the labour market (thus explaining the rise in unemployment among low educated workers in most European countries), while the bumping down of high educated workers would explain overeducation. Both papers are better fit to explain the effects of the increasing supply of educated workers than the effects of the increasing demand for educated workers and/or the "qualitative change in the composition of jobs" entrained by the SBTC (Acemoglu, 1999).
-Other studies suggest that the SBTC should cause overeducation to reduce. The main idea is that educated/skilled workers become more likely to refuse low quality jobs and wait until they find a better one. In particular, according to Albrecht and Vroman (2002) , if the relative demand shift due to SBTC is large enough, it can trigger a switch to an "ex-post segmentation equilibrium" in which high-skilled workers only take up high-skill jobs. More recently, Dolado et al. (2009) enlarge Albrecht and Vroman's model by allowing mismatched workers to keep the option of moving to better jobs through on-the-job search. The introduction of this option reduces the opportunity cost of mismatch for the highly-educated workers and, under the hypothesis of relative labour demand shift, leads to job-to-job transitions. Finally, Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) , state that college-educated workers will flow out of non-college jobs as they are attracted by the increased wages in college jobs caused by the SBTC.
In this theoretical framework, we formulate the following hypotheses to be tested: The first hypothesis is verified by a principal components analysis reported in section 2, which is also used to choose countries representative of different patterns of labour market regulation/ technological development. In order to test the hypotheses 2 and 3, which are central to the paper, we then estimate the effects of demand and supply factors on the individual risks of educational mismatch as will be explained in section 3.
The choice of countries
The choice of countries was made on the basis of a clustering exercise, bases on principal components analysis, which takes into account some indicators of technology, aggregate human capital and employment protection, as presented in Figure 1 . In addition to that we consider the Share of temporary workers (Temp) among the employed population as well as the indicator of State intervention in the labour market, such as expenditure on labour market policies in percentage of GDP (LMP_GDP) (Eurostat online database).
The first factorial axis in Figure 1 shows, on its positive side, a high correlation with a strong labour market regulation (EPL) and the percentage of temporary contracts 9 . The second factorial axis shows, on the positive semi-axis, a strong correlation with technology and human capital indicators. There appears to be no clear relation between employment protection and technological development. Countries are distributed between the four quadrants, and technology variables (Pat and R&D) seem to be more tied to aggregate human capital (HC) and LLL than to EPL and labour market flexibility. In particular, in Mediterranean countries high EPL is coupled with low "technology", whereas Scandinavian countries are characterized by medium levels of employment protection and yet high levels of technology development. In the same way, the UK and Ireland have a very low level of employment protection but they are characterized by a significantly lower technological dimension than Scandinavian countries (in particular, Finland).
Note also that the high R&D spending (per worker) does not necessarily imply the high number of patents applications to the EPO. R&D expenditure per worker in Finland is lower than in Italy and in Portugal ( Source: own calculation on Eurostat online database and OECD indicators, as described above.
The data used for the principal components analysis, together with the percentages of overeducated by country, are reported in In what follows we choose to concentrate on the following countries: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary, France, Germany, Finland, and the UK, representing a different mixture of Technology/EPL as in Figure 1 10 . 10 The choice of countries was also driven by data availability, e.g. Finland is the only Scandinavian country for which regional data was available at NUTS 2 level. 
Data and methodology used for the analysis
The analysis is based on the EU Labour Force Survey 2003 and an ad hoc module on lifelong learning for the same year. The definition of key variables is provided in Table A.2 of the Appendix, followed by descriptive statistics (Table A. 3).
Dependent variable and modeling strategy
In this paper we concentrate on educational qualifications mismatch only 11 We here rely on the empirical measure 12 . The dependent variable takes value '1', which corresponds to undereducation, if the highest level of education achieved (measured in full years)
11 Some of the most recent papers moreover consider the join problem of educational qualifications and skill mismatch (see for instance Quintini 2011a). We do admit the importance of this comprehensive approach, but at the same time understand the related risks. In particular, the subjective (worker's) evaluation data which is generally used to identify the discrepancy between the possessed and required skills can be subject to an error. Thus adhering to educational qualifications can be rewarding. 12 The choice of empirical as opposed to normative or self-assessed measures proposed in the literature (for a recent survey see Quintini 2011b) was dictated by data availability.
is lower than the mode 13 for the occupation (at ISCO 2-digit The set of explanatory variables x i includes both demand and supply factors, as described below. The estimated coefficients should be interpreted as increasing the risk of overeducation/reducing the probability of undereducation if they are positive, and the other way around. Note that the marginal effects do not always coincide with the sign of the estimated coefficients. The marginal effects for the three outcomes of interest will thus be reported alongside to the estimated coefficients (Tables A.4 .1-A.4.10).
Demand and supply factors
The demand factors are drawn primarily from the Eurostat online database and are defined at the regional level (NUTS 2). These include: 1) patents applications to the EPO; 2) expenditure per worker in research and development sector; 3) gross fixed capital formation per person 14 ; 4) youth unemployment rate. In addition to that we calculate 5) the share of ISCO 1, 2 and 3 among the working population, by region, using EU-LFS 2003 data. For the first three indicators we used the average value over the years 2000-2003 in order to account for lagged effects.
The supply factors are represented by individual characteristics, such as age, marital status, level of the highest education obtained, the field of education, working conditions (type of 13 We used a mode-based criterion since, as argued by Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) , it is "less sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data and provides a more accurate measure of the extent of surplus or deficit schooling than can be garnered from the mean".
14 The final choice of demand factors was made after careful examination of other pieces of data that can be informative about the way local labour markets operate, including e.g.: human resources in science and technology as percentage of the working population, long-term unemployment rate, the share of highly educated among the employed/active population (for other viable alternatives see Science and Technology report by the Eurostat 2011).
Eventually we had to restrict the number of explanatory variables in order to avoid strong correlation between them. Some of them are used interchangeably in the output tables (A.4.1-A.4.10).
contract, firm size), occupation, the index of participation into LLL 15 , and a spatial mobility indicator.
Note that the combined use of data at regional and individual levels may be a reason of biased standard errors as illustrated by Moulton (1990) . In what follows we thus report cluster adjusted standard errors.
The issue of sample selection bias
Since educational (mis)match can only be observed for working population, there is an issue of sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) . We account for it by implementing sample selection correction procedure 16 . Moreover we perform estimates separately for men and women in order to account for differences in their labour force participation.
The instrumental variable used is 'Live_alone' 17 or, in alternative, 'Young_children' (for definition see Table A .2). We assume that the person who declares to be living alone would most probably have to rely on incomes from paid work and this should increase the probability for him/her to be employed. At the same time, there are no evident reasons for why the educational match of a person living alone should be different from a person living in a numerous household.
In turn, since the presence of children negatively affects female participation in the labour market (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000) , whereas it provides incentives for male participation (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006b ), this variable is a suitable selection variable when the analysis is disaggregated by gender. The quality and the validity of the instruments have been ascertained (for details see Appendix B).
Empirical findings
We first calculate the incidence of educational mismatch by country, differently for men and women, as reported in Table 2 . Finland, France and the United Kingdom show the highest rates of undereducation coupled with relatively low overeducation rates -something to be expected in the context of technologically advanced and fast developing economies. The Mediterranean countries instead are characterized by higher than average both under-and overeducation rates revealing the inefficacy of the educational systems therein not able to meet the needs of the economies.
The two East European countries considered, the Czech Republic and Hungary, both show asymmetry in the rates of under-/overeducation by gender: male overeducation rates are higher than female rates, while undereducation on the opposite hits more women. This pattern is also confirmed for Mediterranean countries, except for Spain, suggesting that the gender breakdown is particularly important for these two groups of economies.
Germany and Portugal have the lowest rates of overeducation (and total educational mismatch), for different reasons though. Germany is characterized by high average educational attainments, with 29% of the sample considered possessing high level of education and 58% -medium (see Table A .3 in the Appendix). The good match can thus be a sign of a well functioning educational system adapted to the needs of the national labour market. Portugal instead is characterized by very low educational attainments with 89% of the sample considered reporting low levels of education. High education there remains a kind of luxury, and the few ones who manage to get access to it fit well into the labour market after the completion of studies. Those who possess low degree also seem to be placed well. The framework is thus completely different: the economy seems to not create enough incentives but also opportunities for people to invest into education, whereby low educational mismatch can be explained by low educational production.
The above results are consistent with those obtained in a recent study by Croce and Ghignoni (2012) 18 who analyze the evolution of the incidence of overeducation in 26 European 13 countries over an extended period of time (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) The first thing to note is that the joint effect of demand factors does not exceed the joint effect of supply factors. Nevertheless, the significance of these effects varies. For Italy and
Greece the demand side counts very little in reducing educational mismatch, while it is more influential in countries like Germany and Finland. This is in line with the hypothesis we put forward at the beginning of the paper, namely that demand is more effective in technologically advanced countries. Note, moreover, that in some countries, in particular Portugal, men are more responsive to the demand factors, while in others, apparently the United Kingdom, the same holds true for women.
There is no single factor on the demand side which would appear to be significant throughout the countries, suggesting that there may be no universal cure for the educational mismatch. Patents applications (used here as a proxy for the efficiency of R&D sector), cause overeducation to reduce in Portugal, Spain (only for women) and Germany (for both men and women). If moreover we look at the marginal effects, it tends to increase the probability of being properly matched (as in Finland).
The interpretation of the coefficient for the youth unemployment rate is not straightforward. In some cases it tends to decrease the probability of overeducation. This is possible in case, rather than accepting the job which does not correspond to the level of education achieved, a young person prefers to be unemployed (this holds true for men in Spain and women in the UK). But there are also cases when it has positive and significant coefficient, meaning that higher youth unemployment rates are associated with higher educational mismatch.
This is revealing of the pressure that is often felt in the labour market, pushing young people to accept any type of job, even if not appropriate to the level of his/her education (this holds true for men in Portugal, France and Hungary, less so for both men and women in Germany) 20 . The positive effect nevertheless prevails, which highlights the need to facilitate school-to-work transitions in most European countries.
The gross fixed capital formation has the expected negative and significant coefficients for Spain, France and the Czech Republic. In most of the other countries, albeit negative, it does not appear to be significant. This may be a sign of inefficient investments into fixed capital, which gets even worse in case of Portugal, where the coefficient is positive and significant. It has nevertheless positive effect on labour market participation in both of the Eastern European countries considered, as well as in France and Finland.
We also found that increasing expenditure in R&D sector does not help overcoming the problem of educational mismatch. At best it allows reducing undereducation, as in Finland. In
Hungary and Portugal it works in the direction of reducing overeducation but only partially, for women, while increasing undereducation. In no other country it appears to be statistically significant. Probably, this can be taken as a sign of lack of efficiency of spending in R&D.
The variable ISCO123 was used to check the relevance of the SBTC hypothesis. In particular, the higher percentage of top occupations among the working population means higher needs for educated labour force. In case it associates to lower/higher rates of educational mismatch, SBTC causes educational mismatch to reduce/increase. The empirical findings are partly supportive to this hypothesis. In most of the countries for which the variable appears to be significant (including Germany, Hungary, Finland, the UK and Portugal for men only) the marginal effects are positive for undereducation and negative for overeducation, suggesting that SBTC tends to increase the risk of undereducation while reducing the risk of overeducation.
On the supply side, age counts. In about half of the countries considered the risk of overeducation tends to increase with age, while undereducation tends to reduce. This is true for Germany, Spain and men in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the UK. In Italy and Greece, on the opposite, the risk of overeducation is higher for younger workers, while undereducation is lower for them. This identifies the young cohorts as being most exposed to the waste of human capital in the Italian and Greek contexts.
The counterbalancing factor appears to be individual participation into LLL. It tends to reduce, in a statistically significant way, the risk of overeducation in all of the countries 20 In this framework, some authors (Rice, 1999, for the UK, and Giannelli and Monfardini, 2003, for Italy) argue that unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of education and therefore increases the probability that a young person is studying, rather than searching for a job (or accepting a job below his/her expectations). By contrast, Pastore (2005), focusing on a sample of young Poles, finds that high unemployment regions provide a disincentive to further education, and an incentive for job search for young people in Central and Eastern European countries.
considered for which the index of participation into LLL could be constructed 21 . It may thus be an important complement to formal education and an indicator of individual motivation. The latter is an important characteristic of individual heterogeneity. In fact, not that the type of skills acquired by means of LLL are 'sold' at the market (components of LLL index are described in Tab.A2), rather they enhance the employability of a person as well as the chances to be properly matched. Our results also show that participation into LLL is associated to higher risk of undereducation. All together this would suggest that individual motivation to invest in informal training after leaving formal education can help people with a low level of schooling to stay in employment, whereas it can favour movements along career paths for those possessing a high level of education 22 .
The choice of education field appears to be crucial for both males and females in all countries. At the same time there are fields of education which serve expanding sectors and thus are able to reduce overeducation but sustain high rates of undereducation (e.g. Science, Health and Education). Engineering remains "male-friendly" in that it allows men to find a better match, less so for women.
In some countries, including Portugal and Spain but also Finland, men appear to be more responsive to the demand factors, compared to women. Moreover, it is worth noticing that in the UK (and to a lesser extent in France) the number of patents applications seems to increase overeducation and educational mismatch for women (but not for men).
Overall, the supply factors play an important role for both increasing participation and reducing overeducation, whereas the demand factors considered are more effective in pushing up participation rather than reducing educational mismatch.
Finally, we also perform the estimates without correcting for sample selection for those countries where it has not been found (for men or women, or both). This allows incorporating some additional variables of interest, in particular: the size of the firm (dummy for small firm), part-time worker, temporary contract and mover (see Table A .5 in the Appendix).
Working for a small firm tends to increase the risk of overeducation/reduce the risk of undereducation. This is in line with existing findings (Dolton and Silles, 2001) and our expectations. In fact as long as the size of the firm gets larger the recruitment procedures tend to be more formalized. Moreover, there is more space for career advancement, which renders underutilization of human capital less probable. On the opposite, small firms have less possibilities for on-the-job specific training, thus the employer's forward looking behavior would 16 preclude the recruitment of a person which is undereducated. It holds true for men in Portugal, Hungary, France and Germany, as well as for women in Finland, Hungary and France.
The effects of part-time and temporary contracts are not univocal. Being on part-time has practically no effect on men, also because it is less common among men (see Tab. A3). At the same time it tends to considerably increase the risk of overeducation for women. The reason is that part-time is often a solution for women with children, who have less bargaining power. Thus there is more possibility that employers will be setting higher requirements for entry into job (with no big costs implied), giving rise to overeducation.
On the opposite, temporary contracts have less of an impact for women, while they have important consequences for men: increasing overeducation/reducing undereducation in Hungary and France, and quite the opposite in Germany and Finland. Importantly, they also tend to considerably reduce the probability of being well-matched in the case of men (except for France). These results point out that the hypothesis of an "exchange" between "good match" and "security" of jobs is not always confirmed. Similar results were obtained by Croce and Ghignoni (2012) .
Finally, we check for the effect of spatial mobility. Indeed, an increasing literature recognizes that overeducation can arise when workers dislike or are prevented from the geographical mobility needed to search for a suitable job if demand and supply of skills do not have a homogeneous spatial distribution (see, amongst others, Büchel and van Ham, 2003; Croce and Ghignoni, 2011) . According to our results, commuting allows reducing the probability of being overeducated, while increasing the probability of being undereducated, but the effect is statistically significant in few countries only, for men and women in France and for women in Portugal.
These findings raise an issue of an optimal mix of educational and labour market policies to counter the problem of educational mismatch; they will differ for men and women, and among countries.
Discussion
The general context, including the way educational systems (supply side) and labour markets (demand side) operate, may shed some light on our understanding of the revealed crosscountry differences.
What counts for the outcome of interest (probability of educational mismatch), is how easy/difficult it is to get higher levels of education, whereby there is a risk of overeducation/ undereducation. The share of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working age population, which has been used for the empirical analysis, is one of the characteristics of the actual outcome, in turn it can be influenced e.g. by the possibility for parents to choose a public versus private school for their children at all levels of education, by the financial incentives/disincentives for school choice (such as school vouchers and/or tuition tax credits available to help families offset the costs of private schooling), by the share of public versus private universities, by access to credit for students, and, more generally, by all types of public subsidies for education provided by national and local governments.
None of the ten European countries considered in this study is characterized by too tight conditions to access higher education (with the partial exception of Portugal) (OECD 2010), nevertheless, the percentage of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working age population varies a lot (Table A .1).
The inflow of graduates can also be affected by the stimulus that the labour market creates in the form of private returns to education and the way school-to-work transitions operate.
By comparing Table A.1 with Table A .6, one can see that the aggregate human capital is higher in those countries in which youth unemployment rate and the duration of school-to-work transitions are lower (in particular, Germany and the UK). On the other hand, high returns to education may provide an incentive to continue studying. In practice, however, the economic incentive to education can be neutralized by the lack of public subsidies for needy students, which seem to be the case of Portugal. The facilitated access to education, revealed by the high share of tertiary graduates among the working age population, theoretically might affect the probability of overeducation. In this framework, very low aggregate human capital (as compared to other European countries), can be one of the explanations for the low level of overeducation in Portugal (see Table A .l). In other countries, characteristics other than the "quantity" of aggregate human capital matter. Indeed, economic literature often rejected the hypothesis that the increase of the supply of skilled labour per se can be seen as a relevant factor fuelling overeducation 23 (Croce and Ghignoni, 2012) . In this paper we thus investigate the role of other factors influencing educational mismatch.
In particular, despite formal education remains the most important stage of the education process, there is an increasing role of non-formal education, including LLL. In this respect too there is much heterogeneity among countries. The share of population participating into LLL activities (Table A .l) ranges from 1.8% in Greece to more than 23% in Finland. As shown by our estimation results (Tables A.4 .1-A.4.10), participation into LLL is essential for reducing overeducation. At the same time, it operates at different scales depending on how much the country invests in cultural infrastructure (by that we mean e.g. libraries and internet supported computer labs).
Another important worker's characteristic which affects the risk of educational mismatch is the field of education obtained. In Mediterranean countries Engineering attracts 18% of students at most (the figure stands for Italy) compared to about 30% of students in Western European countries considered and more than 40% of students in Eastern European countries considered (see Table A .6) 24 . At the same time, Humanities, Languages and Arts together with Social
Sciences attract almost half of the graduates in Italy. This is an additional explanation as to why
Italian high education graduates have difficulties to face labour demand becoming ever more sophisticated. As a result the country features one of the highest rates of both under-and overeducation among workers (Table 2 ). Few in numbers 25 and yet misplaced, as rightly emphasized in Franzini and Raitano (2009) . These facts are difficult to reconcile and are revealing of the deficiencies in the way the labour market and the educational system operate.
Italy (as other Mediterranean countries) is also known for one of the highest youth unemployment rates and lacking opportunities for young people at the start of career, thus difficult school-to-work transition (see Table A .6 ). This process is much facilitated in countries like Germany, and to some extent Finland and France, where the "dual" education system operates 26 . Despite the high aggregate human capital, these three countries are characterized by relatively low incidence of overeducation. At the same time, Germany, Finland and France are characterized by high rates of undereducation. These results can be explained by the widespread use of apprenticeship. Indeed, apprenticeship can improve workers screening by allowing employers to discover qualities and innate individual attributes of future employees, and by providing employees with work-related skills and competences, besides their formal degree of education (Ryan, 1998) . In this case employers may get convinced that some workers are fully qualified to perform a specific job, for which they could appear to be formally undereducated. At the same time the better knowledge of workers' characteristics would also improve the match of individuals with a high educational degree.
Other factors influencing the educational mismatch reside in the demand side of the market, namely, in labour market characteristics and the level of technological development.
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The empirical analysis showed that the demand factors played minor role in determining educational mismatch. Their potential for reducing educational mismatch is expected to further weaken over the crisis, so there may be little space for policy interventions. Yet the effects of demand factors were found to be higher in technologically advanced countries and can possibly be amplified also in other contexts e.g. by increasing expenditure on/ improving the efficiency of research and development. This goal has been pursued by the majority of the European countries.
Nevertheless, they rank lower in terms of research intensity (expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP) compared to the USA or Japan, as well as in terms of the real output (measured by patents applications to the EPO) 27 .
Finland is an interesting case in point. It often appears at the top of the ranking in Science and Technology Report (ibidem), moreover has the highest share of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working population and at the same time the lowest share of overeducated workers (see Table 2 ). What makes it possible?
The well-known fact is that the higher the efficiency of research, the more investment it is going to attract. In turn the efficiency of research is largely determined by a proper mixture of fundamental and applied research. Some countries are known for achievement in applied research (e.g. the US), while others are more successful is pursuing fundamental research (e.g. Figure 1 . Alongside the flexicurity nexus it also implies the whole range of active and passive labour market policies. Moreover these countries are known for large investments into human capital, from the point of view of both quantity and quality 28 . All this is expected to create a self-sustaining mechanism of human capital production and utilization resulting in the low incidence of overeducation.
27 On average, European countries spend 1.9% of GDP on R&D (in 2009), which is lower compared to a 3% goal set by the Lisbon strategy for 2010. Out of the countries considered only Finland has overcome the 3% mark of GDP spent on R&D, Germany was above the EU-average, and the rest of the countries considered lag behind. The output, measured in terms of patents applications to the EPO, is also relatively modest compared to the world leaders, again the USA and Japan. Nevertheless, in terms of the number of patents per million of inhabitants some countries, including Germany, Sweden and Finland, outperform even the world leaders (Eurostat 2011). 28 The evidence can be drawn from PISA scores reported in Tab. A6. Finland has the highest level out of the ten countries considered.
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Another remarkable feature of Scandinavian labour markets is the high female labour force participation. For Mediterranean countries instead it remains a policy objective, and the main way used to achieve it is increasing the educational attainments of women.
While entering the labour market women nevertheless are more exposed to overeducation compared to men, at least this holds true for countries where female participation is high (France, Finland and the United Kingdom). Instead, in Mediterranean countries, where women remain underrepresented among employees, their increasing educational attainments remain obscured.
At the same time, the situation when women obtain education and do not work is certainly the worst outcome, resulting in the major waste of human capital 29 .
The realities moreover are such that women generally tend to perform less qualified and less paid jobs (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009) . This is partly explained by pre-market choices of specialization which guides them to traditionally female dominated sectors (ibidem).
However, horizontal segregation does not always cause overeducation. An example of school teaching (largely performed by women) represents the case when there is practically no mismatch, due to formalized recruitment procedures. A completely different situation is when women try to enter the traditionally male dominated occupations. They often do not manage to compete due to higher family burden and thus hold positions which do not correspond to the level of education obtained (on par or even higher than men's). Thus there are two actions to be supported. One is to encourage atypical choices of professions by women. Another is to eliminate the obstacles they meet further entering the labour market. Given the ever increasing input from female labour, this may result in reducing educational mismatch.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
This paper deals with the effects of demand and supply factors on educational qualifications mismatch in Europe.
We estimated country-specific ordered probit models (separately for men and women, and taking into account the issue of sample selection) in order to assess the effects of demand and supply factors on the probability of being under-/properly or overeducated in ten European countries representing different patterns of labour market regulation, degrees of technological intensity and the incidence of educational mismatch.
The empirical findings are supportive to the hypothesis that the adoption of new technologies produces a relative demand shift which favours highly educated workers and 29 One cannot even identify these cases by looking at employed only, like in case of Our results show that the joint effect of demand factors does not exceed the joint effect of supply factors. Moreover, demand factors are often more effective in pushing up labour force participation rather than reducing overeducation, whereas supply factors play important role for both increasing participation and reducing overeducation.
Overall, policy initiatives targeted at reducing educational mismatch are expected to be more effective when dealing with the supply side effects and need to take into account country specificities as well as to identify the target groups, e.g. men/women, younger/older workers.
At the same time, demand factors should not be neglected, especially during the times of the crisis in Europe. The revealed potential of increasing the efficiency of R&D sector as the mean to counter educational mismatch is particularly important. More generally, enhancing the technological level is expected to improve job-education matches.
Other policy implications that emerge from our study include the improvement of schoolto-work transition (the German system can be an example to follow), by also promoting a better use of temporary contracts. In particular, temporary contract should imply for young workers giving up some job-security in exchange for a better match. At the limit, they should be used as a 'stepping stone' to higher quality jobs.
Our results also show that increasing investments into cultural infrastructure, in order to incentivize participation into LLL, would improve educational match throughout Europe.
Providing guidance in the choice of field of study, especially for women, has a potential to reduce educational mismatch. Reconciliation policies are also expected to produce positive effects by augmenting aspirations about future job possibilities and, eventually, making women more competitive in the labour markets.
The positive examples here identified, in particular Finland for Scandinavian countries and Germany for Western European countries, are characterizes by the capacity to create a selfsustaining mechanism of human capital production and utilization. These countries also adhere to a flexicurity model able to effectively include the groups of vulnerable workers, in particular women and youth. All this results in the lower incidence of overeducation. Dummies for the field of highest level of education successfully completed. The baseline is general programs/services, depending on the coding of variables (for details see Table A2 with descriptive statistics). Note: Means of variables (standard deviations are in parenthesis, except for dummies); * variables defined at regional level. Gross fixed capital 0.147*** 0.065*** -0.012*** -0.004*** 0.016*** 0.087 0.064*** -0.012*** -0.003*** 0.015*** formation Gross fixed capital 0.092* -0.150*** 0.037*** -0.003*** -0.034*** 0.126*** -0.212*** 0.069*** -0.041*** -0.029*** formation 
Instrumental variable
High level of 1.021*** 3.215*** -0.296*** -0.594*** 0.891*** 0.792*** 3.338*** -0.408*** -0.490*** 0.899*** education Temporary contract -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.059*** -0.059*** -0.001*** -0.047*** -0.015*** 0.062*** -0.059*** 0.045*** 0.015*** 0.086*** -0.048*** -0.038*** Note: The estimates without sample selection are provided only for those countries where it has not been found (either for men or women, or both). Here we report the coefficients for additional variables, but the specification includes also all the variables as in Table A .4 (except for the instrumental variables).
Source: own calculation using EU-LFS 2003. 
B. Technical Appendix
Here we test the quality and the validity of the instrumental variables used in the empirical analysis (Live_alone or
Young_children dummies).
Instrumental quality is ensured if there is a strong correlation between the instrument and the employment probability. A statistic commonly used in order to test this condition (Bound et al., 1995) is the R2 of the first stage regression with the included instrument "partialled-out", or Shea partial R2 (for an application to the analysis of overeducation see e.g. Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006b). In our first stage regressions the partial R2 on the excluded instruments range from 9% to 6% for the variable Live_alone and from 13% to 8% for the variable Young_children, suggesting that both instruments make a relevant contribution to explaining labour market participation (see table B1 ).
Instrumental validity is ensured if the instrument can be legitimately excluded from the overeducation equation. This assumption is often checked through the Sargan test. Nevertheless, this test is valid only in case of over-identification (i.e. the number of valid instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables), which is not our case. Indeed, having young children or living alone do not have the same impact on labour market participation (and on overeducation risks) in all countries. Then, we decided not to use both variables as instruments for all countries, but we choose the better instrument case by case. Following the suggestion of Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2010), we checked the validity of the instruments by using the approach proposed by Dolton and Vignoles (2002) . According to these authors, a valid instrument must be uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome equation, and thus it should not affect the risk of overeducation conditional on the included explanatory variables. When the residuals from the overeducation equations were regressed on the instrument, we obtained R2 ranging from 0.0009 to 0.0001 (Live_alone) and from 0.0006 to 0.0004 (Young_children) as in Table B .1. This indicates that both instruments do not explain any significant variation in the residual variability and hence are valid. 
